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As the COVID-19 pandemic enters its second year, requiring extensive lockdowns to contain the
spread of the virus, its concrete impact on businesses is becoming clearer. The numbers are
stark: 906,000 UK businesses are at serious risk of failure before April 2021. Peter Lambert and
John Van Reenen look at the numbers and propose some policies to contain the damage.
Professor John Van Reenen will be speaking at the LSE online public event Going for Growth next
Monday, 8 February. He will discuss how the UK and the world can get back on a path to
sustainable recovery.
Almost 15% of UK businesses are at-risk of permanently closing by the start of April, according to
a recent ONS Business Impacts of Coronavirus Survey (BICS). The fortnightly BICS surveyed
8,764 UK businesses between 29 December 2020 and 10 January 2021. It revealed that 3.9% of
businesses have ‘no con dence’ that they will survive over the next three months, the highest
fraction ever reported in the history of the survey. A further 10.8% have ‘low con dence’ of
survival. Together, we de ne these two groups as being ‘at-risk’.
Table 1 looks at how many businesses this represents. According to the latest ONS Business
Population Estimates (BPE), there were 2.65 million registered businesses in the UK at the start
of 2020, with a combined employment of 24.1 million jobs. These registered businesses include
all those that are VAT and/or PAYE registered, based on the Inter-Departmental Business Register
(IDBR). The at-risk proportion (14.7%) of this group implies 390,000 businesses are at serious
risk failure before April 2021.
There are a further 3.33 million unregistered businesses in the UK (those that are not PAYE or
VAT registered). The employment this group covers includes owner/operators. If we extrapolate
BICS survey responses to cover the population of all businesses (registered and unregistered),
we  nd that 15.1% are at-risk of exit. This is likely to be an underestimate, given that the survey
responses do not re ect that these unregistered businesses are smaller and therefore likely at a
higher risk of closure (see also the recent Federation of Small-business report).
The second row of Table 1 multiplies this 15.1% of ‘at-risk’ population with the total number of
businesses (registered and unregistered), which total 5.98 million. This calculation implies that
906,000 UK businesses will be at serious risk of failure before early April 2021.
Table 1. Number of businesses and employment at risk of closure by the end of March (all  gures in
thousands)
Notes: In column (1), ‘At-Risk’ is derived from businesses that replied they had ‘Low’ or ‘No
Con dence’ to the question ‘How much con dence does your business have that it will survive
the next three months?’ (BICS Wave 21, released January 14 , 2021). 8,764 registered
businesses answered between 29  December 2020 to 10  January 2021, so this relates to
whether they expected to be alive by late March and early April 2021. These responses are
weighted by the ONS to be re ective of the population of registered businesses, based on the
Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR (excluding four sector Agriculture, Public
Administration and Defence; Public provision of education and health’ and Finance and
Insurance’). ‘Registered businesses’ are those that are either VAT and/or PAYE registered. ‘All
businesses’ also include unregistered businesses. The data for column (2) uses the latest
Business Population Estimates (BPE, 2020, released Oct 8 , 2020). Employment includes




businesses in the  rst two rows we multiply the percentage at-risk in column (1) by the estimated
number of businesses in column (2) to get the absolute number at risk in column (3). To derive
our number of at-risk jobs in the last two rows, we multiply the employment-weighted percentage
at-risk in column (1) by the employment number in column (2) to get total employment at risk in
column (3). Note that the employment-weighted proportion at risk is relative to private-sector
employment. The last two rows in Column (1) are lower than the  rst two rows because small
businesses are at greater risk (see Table 2) and by de nition have lower employment. See
Appendix A for full details on these calculations.
The last two rows of Table 1 estimate how many jobs are in the businesses that are at risk of
closure. The employment-weighted percentage at risk is lower because larger businesses are at
lower risk of closure than smaller ones (see Table notes and Appendix A). We calculate that
about 1.9 million jobs are at risk in registered businesses of being lost by April 2021 (8% of all
registered business employment). Including unregistered businesses and their owner/operators
increases this number to 2.5 million (9% of all business employment).
Table 2 breaks down the at-risk group by business size. It is clear that the risk of failure is much
greater for smaller businesses. Micro enterprises with nine employees or less have the highest
risk of failure (15.4%) whereas medium-sized enterprises (100-249 employees) had the lowest
risk (4.0%). Thus, the brunt of the impact will be on the smallest enterprises that are likely to be
the least prepared. This is why the at-risk proportion in Table 1 is higher for all businesses (which
have a greater share of small businesses) than for registered business only.
Table 2. Businesses ‘at-risk’ by business size
Notes: See notes to Table 1 for sources and de nitions. Business size is measured by number of
employees who receive salary/wages, at the enterprise group level.
How do these  gures compare to ‘normal’ times? In a typical year, there is a high volume of
business closures (deaths) as well as a high number of new business start-ups (births). This
business dynamism is a desirable feature of market economies as jobs from old businesses are
replaced by new jobs, and capital is redeployed. But a large excess of deaths over births can
create economic and social problems, contributing to large-scale unemployment and the
scrapping of productive capital. It can also trigger more systemic  nancial instability.
In the  rst quarter of 2019, the number of UK registered business deaths was 85,520 and rose to
119,560 for 2020Q1, when the pandemic started. In both these quarters, however, new business
births were greater than deaths, so on-net the economy gained registered businesses. To
compare, if the entire at-risk group of 389,912 registered businesses we identi ed in Table 1 were
to permanently close in 2021Q1, then quarterly deaths would be up 356% compared to 2019Q1,
or 226% compared to 2020Q1. If realised, these numbers would be unprecedented in modern
times.
Our comparisons above show that the looming wave of business closure is startling relative to
both a ‘business-as-usual’ benchmark (2019Q1) as well as compared to the initial shock of the
pandemic (2020Q1). Other surveys also point to an impending wave of bankruptcies of small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by April 2021, with similar numbers to our own.
The policy response
 While many policies can provide targeted support to speci c industries such as hospitality (e.g.
VAT cuts, business rates holidays and ‘Eat Out to Help Out’), our main focus will be on policies
aimed at reducing the cost of  nance across the entire economy through subsidised loans. More
speci cally, loan guarantees and debt restructuring should be used to balance the need for
immediate protection with longer-term reallocation.
Loan guarantees
COVID-related business loan support schemes account for about 16% of the £430 billion in all
loans outstanding to private non- nancial corporations.
The best-known COVID-related business loan scheme is the Coronavirus Business Interruption
Loan Scheme (CBILS). This provides government guarantees of 80% of a loan, as well as paying
interest and fees for a year. But the Bounce Back Loan Scheme (BBLS) is even larger in cash
terms and provides a more generous 100% guarantee for loans up to £50,000 with essentially
zero checks on creditworthiness (with the aim of getting loans out as quickly as possible).
Launched in May 2020, by mid-December 2020, the BBLS had lent £43.5 billion to about 1.4
million businesses compared to £19 billion under CBILS to just over 83,000 businesses (see
Figure B1). The National Audit O ce expects up to 60% of businesses to default on BBLS loans.
Figure B1. Cost of business relief schemes
The case for maintaining these partial guarantees on loans, even in the recovery phase, is strong.
It is very hard to assess which businesses will survive and which will close. Banks cannot fully
diversify credit risk and so, left to their own devices, will generally ask for too high a risk premium
or refuse to lend altogether. Furthermore, because the lock-down has hit the capital ratios of
banks, they will be more reluctant to lend even to viable businesses that may be short on liquidity.
The government can alleviate this problem by providing partial loan guarantees. This makes
sense as it is best placed to diversify credit risk and to absorb the macro risk due to uncertainty.
By offering partial (instead of full) guarantees, losses are shared, which mitigates the problem of
bank lending to fundamentally bad creditors.
As we exit the lockdown phase, these loan guarantee programmes should be modi ed in at least
two ways. First, the generosity of the guarantees should decrease over time. This should be
gradual and tied to the state of the economy. Second, the use of state guarantees should be
linked to more obligations such as restrictions on dividend payments and/or higher future
corporate income taxes.
Debt restructuring
Businesses in the post-pandemic environment can be thought of as being in one of three states:
(i) privately viable (the present value of their pro ts exceeds recovery value) and solvent (the
present value of pro ts exceeds current debt); (ii) not viable and thus not solvent; or (iii) viable
but have been made insolvent by the shock and thus need debt restructuring.
Viable businesses are covered by loan guarantees. But even with subsidies, there is still a case
for intervention if the social value of the business exceeds the private value. This may happen
because there is a value in the bundle of assets and relationships a business has with its
employees, suppliers and customers, that is not fully priced in by the businesses’ creditors. A
depressed economy with high unemployment and underutilised capital can be severely affected
by a wave of bankruptcies, and this ‘scarring’ effect can be very persistent. Private creditors may
end up closing too many businesses from the social point of view.
One practical set of proposals for implementing these ideas is through a UK Recovery
Corporation, as proposed by CityUK. Our sense is that something like this is the clearest path
forward, but there is an alternative: debt forgiveness.
Although our proposal avoids the economic damage of a sharp withdrawing of support, even the
more generous provisions of equity for debt swaps will leave businesses with diluted incentives
to grow, as the State shares more of the upside bene ts. Hence, this may reduce the incentive to
invest in order to grow. These disincentives could be mitigated with other programmes of
investment support focused on key areas – for example, research and development, training and
technology adoption (especially around the climate change agenda).
A more radical alternative would be to just write-off all debts. Businesses that were viable would
have strong incentives to grow. Those that were not could simply sell assets and exit. The
problem with forgiveness is twofold. First, the hit to the public  nances would be larger. Second,
if businesses suspect this will be the case, then they will be more likely to borrow excessively
now. There may also be moral hazard issues for future bailouts, but given the likely one-off nature
of the pandemic, this is a lesser concern.
 Long-run outcomes and policy
In addition to tackling debt overhang, one can also target the longer-run growth prospects of the
UK by providing support to businesses with high growth potential. There have already been a
number of schemes aimed at exactly this (see Appendix B for examples like the Future Fund). We
support additional, targeted assistance to businesses that not only have large growth potential
themselves, but which might also provide productivity bene ts to other businesses through
spillovers from innovation.
As part of this more targeted support to high growth-potential businesses, support that explicitly
targets start-up businesses should be extended. Existing schemes like the Seed Equity
Investment Scheme should be expanded. The general principle behind this is to (i) reduce
investment risk for ‘angels’; (ii) encourage start-ups and (iii) foster new investment. It is




• This blog post is a shorter version of the report A major wave of UK business closures by April
2021? The scale of the problem and what can be done, Paper Number CEPCOVID-19-016, LSE
Centre for Economic Performance (CEP).
• The post gives the views of its authors, not the position of LSE Business Review or the London
School of Economics.
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